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  Japanese companies have been prohibited from using accrual manipulat ion 
for R&D since 1999; however, many Japanese companies had not used accrual 
manipulat ion even before 1999. Many companies (more than 90%) had 
expensed all of R&D spending when it  occurred because of tax benef its,  
despite the fact that they could have used accrual manipulat ion of R&D 
spending based on the exist ing accounting rules. Therefore, Japanese f irms 
would seem to have, in general, used real manipulat ion to (A) increase or 
decrease R&D spending, and/or (B) to change the content of R&D to gain 
target results within the short-term. 
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 Using the f inancial data from 1980 to 2006 of Japanese electronics 
companies, this paper shows two kinds of evidence that managers adjusted the 
amount of R&D spending for all periods according to their expected income and 
that since 2000 they have tr ied to shorten the term in which the benef it  of their  
R&D spending was realized to improve short-term performance. 
  To determine the amount and/or the content of R&D spending for the 
purpose of gaining a short-term benef it  can result  in the loss of opportunit ies to 
gain greater long-term benef its.   
 
Ⅰ Introduction 
  Japanese f irms, in general,  consistent ly increased their R&D spending from 
the end of World War II  to 1991.  Japanese managers stated, and believed, 
that increasing R&D investment was their obligat ion, regardless of the effect 
on the short-term performance of their f irm.  However, R&D decreased for the 
f irst  t ime in 1992, just after the burst of the economic bubble in Japan.  From 
that t ime unti l 1999, Japanese managers, according to Mande et al. [2000],  
made optimal allocat ions to R&D. As a result , even in 2005, the R&D spending 
of Japanese f irms has been ranked number two in the world. 
  Japanese companies have been prohibited from using accrual manipulat ion 
for R&D since 1999.  However, many Japanese companies had not used 
accrual manipulat ion even before 1999 because of tax benef its, despite the 
fact that they could have used it  for R&D spending based on the exist ing 
accounting rules. Therefore, Japanese f irms would seem to have generally 
used real manipulat ion: (A) increase or decrease R&D spending and/or (B) 
change the content of R&D to meet short-term target results. 
  This paper shows empir ical evidence that Japanese electronics companies 
have used real manipulat ion, especially changes in the content of their 
investment, regardless of changes in the accounting rules. 
 
Ⅱ  R&D investment by Japanese electronics companies 
  Graph No.1 shows the t ime series change in R&D investment for the leading 
Japanese electronics companies. The historical change of R&D investment by 
the electronics industry in Japan is almost the same as that of Japanese f irms 
in general. The amount of R&D spending grew continuously during the period 
between 1980 and 1991. After 1992, although the total amount of R&D 
spending of al l electronics companies was growing, the t ime series change 
became errat ic, depending on the f irm. Moreover, companies can be divided 
into two groups based on their tendencies in R&D spending after 1997; some, 
such as Fuj itsu and NEC, have decreased it and others, such as Panasonic and 
Sony, have increased it regardless of their performance. As graph 2 makes 
clear, the Japanese electronics industry, including Panasonic and Sony, fel l  
into a cr it ical situat ion from 2000 to 2001.    





















































Table 1 shows that Japanese companies, except for those in the chemical 
and text i le industr ies, increased R&D spending from 1991 and 2004,. Although 
the growth rate of R&D spending by the electronics industry decreased 
between 1991 and 2004, the actual amount of R&D spending by the electronics 
industry consistent ly increased. 
                             【Table 1】  
 





Graph 2 shows the histor ical change of the operat ing income per  sales  rat io, 
after adjust ing for inf lat ion, of Japanese companies. The red l ine represents 
the electronics industry, the blue l ine represents the automobile industry, and 
the black l ine represents all industr ies.  We can see that this rat io has been 
decreasing, by and large, despite a continuous increase of R&D spending, as 
1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 2005-06
Pharmaceutical (9.4) 8.6 3.5 6.0 12.5
Electronics (5.5) 12.4 1.7 0.8 5.1
Transportation  
Equipment (4.2) 9.4 0.2 6.6 11.3
Machinery (3.7) 9.5 2.9 3.9 8.3
Chemistry (3.7) 7.4 -0.5 -0.4 7.4
Textile (1.7) 8.0 -1.5 -15.2 11.8
Growth Rate of Industry-classified R&D
【Graph 2】
Declining Tend of Operating Income / 
Sales Ratio for Japanese Manufactures





shown in table 1. Notably, the income of the electronics industry plunged from 
2000 to 2001, which is very important to our research. 
 
Ⅲ  Previous Research and Hypothesis  
1. Management Short-term decision-making and R&D Spending 
  Inst itut ional investors (especially,  mutual fund investors) reward short-term 
performance with large investment inf lows. Fund managers facing strong 
performance-related f lows have been shown to focus more on short horizon 
investments:  The fund manager’s investment horizons are driven by the short 
horizons of their investors. Based on Suto et al. [2005], Japanese inst itut ional 
investors in 2004 were much more myopic than their American counterparts. In 
Japan, about three fourths of the inst itut ional investors planned to buy and sell 
within six months, compared to only one fourth in the US. Pressure from the 
capital market tends to make managers become myopic. 
  Notably, Bushee [1998] examined, in the U.S., whether or not inst itut ional 
investors create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce 
investment in R&D. He found that a large proport ion of ownership by 
inst itut ions signif icant ly increased the probabil i ty that managers would reduce 
R&D to reverse an earnings decline. This was especially the case if  they had 
high portfol io turnover and engaged in momentum trading,  
 
2. Accrual and real manipulation 
  It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of manipulat ion, accrual and 
real.  Accrual manipulat ion means "accrual-based earnings management"…"to 
change the t iming of  a presentat ion" (Shipper [1989]).  Roychowdhury [2006] 
refers to it as “earnings management through accrual manipulat ion.” Real 
manipulat ion means "real earnings management"… "to change the t iming of a 
transact ion" (Shipper [1989]). Roychowdhury [2006] dif ferent ly postulates it as 
“earnings management through real act ivit ies.” Shipper's conception is too 
narrow. Real manipulat ion should include not only changes in the t iming of  
R&D spending but also the discontinuation of a planned transact ion and/or the 
change of the content of a transact ion to meet short-term earnings goals if  the 
part done through a manager's real act ivity is important for i ts conception.  
Managers use both accrual and real manipulat ion to improve short-term 
performance.  
  Japanese f irms have been prohibited from using R&D spending as a deferred 
asset since 1999. Even previous to 1999, they had not deferred R&D spending 
because of tax benefits. For example, only 5 of the 53 electronics f irms had 
used R&D spending as a deferred asset before 1998. Thus, most Japanese 
f irms may have used only real manipulat ion in their  earnings management. To 
attain a short-term performance gain, a f irm might adopt two methods, used 
alternat ively or simultaneously, to meet their target performance; ①  adjust 
( increase or decrease) R&D spending, or ②  change the content of R&D.   
  Previous studies have documented that R&D spending is both an impetus for 
the growth of the f irm and a source of competit ive advantage (Ett l ie [1998]; Lev 
and Sougiannis [1996]). However, managers may reduce R&D spending to 
opportunist ically boost short-term performance (Bushee [1998]).    
 
3. The Horizon and Myopia Problems 
  Past empir ical research has presented evidence for the existence of a 
“Horizon Problem” and a “Myopia Problem” for R&D Investment.  
  Dechow and Sloan [1991] reported that opportunist ic reduct ions in R&D 
spending become more l ikely when the CEO approaches ret irement. This so 
called “Horizon Problem” is not covered in this paper. 
  The “Myopia Problem” is as fol lows; Opportunist ic reduct ions in R&D 
spending become more l ikely when the f irm faces a small earnings decline or a 
small loss. Mande et al. [2000] attempted to determine the relat ionship 
between income smoothing and the discret ionary R&D expenditure of  
Japanese f irms. They tested whether or not Japanese managers adjusted R&D 
based on short-term performance. Their results show that Japanese f irms in 
several industr ies adjust their R&D budgets to smooth prof its. Interest ingly, 
adjustments to R&D are larger in expansion years. These results point to 
short-term decision making by Japanese managers that is similar to that 
documented for U.S. managers. 
  Based on the above discussion, our null hypotheses are as fol lows; 
H1. Managers do not adjust R&D spending to improve short-term 
performance. 
H2. Managers do not change the content of R&D spending to improve 
short-term performance. 
 
Ⅳ   Analytical Method 
 Previous research dealt with the regressional relat ionship between R&D 
investment and sales or operat ing income without considering a t ime lag or  
with a f ixed t ime lag.  Therefore, we attempted to determine whether or not an 
increase or decrease of R&D investment causes an increase or decrease of  
operat ing income by incorporat ing a f lexible t ime lag. More concretely, we 
determined the relat ionship between current performance and investment in 
R&D at t-1, then worked backwards for each successive year unt i l the 
relat ionship lost stat ist ical signif icance. We then repeated the same process in 
regards to the performance of each year, proceeding from t-1 backwards.   







Pt may be the result of the R&D of t-1,t-2, t-3, and so on.  To the contrary, 
R&D t-4 may have an inf luence on the P of t-3, t-2, t-1, and so on.  
  The problem with the est imation of this equation is that because of the high 
correlat ions between RDt and its lagged values, we do not get reliable 
est imates of the parameter ß i, the so-called mult icolinearity problem. Irving 
Fisher [1937] assumed the ß i to decline arithmetically and S. Almon [1965]  
generalized this to the case where the ß i fol low a polynomial of degree r in i .  
(1) Pt vs. R&Dt-1, R&Dt-2, R&Dt-3, R&Dt-4 ･････
R&Dt-4 R&Dt-3 R&Dt-2 R&Dt-1 Pt
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1
(2) R&Dt-4 vs. Pt-3, Pt-2, Pt-1, ･････
Pt-4 Pt-3 Pt-2 Pt-1 Pt
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1
R&Dt-4
This is known as the Almon lag or the Polynomial lag (Madala [2001], pp. 
412-415).  
  Because we have to decide the shape of the equation in this model, we 
assumed that the effect of R&D investment would fol low the shape of a 
quadrat ic equation based on the declining curve of the accumulated value in 
the patent r ight.   
  Moreover, we chose capital expenditure, advert isement expense and R&D 
expense as the determinants of the operat ing income, according to Lev & 
Sougiannis [1996], because variables other than R&D investment can also 
have an effect on operat ing income. The adjusted operat ing income per sales 
is assumed to be proport ional to the sum of the capital expenditure with a 
one-year t ime lag, R&D with a f lexible t ime lag, and advert isement cost per 
sales with a one-year t ime lag, according to Lev & Sougiannis [1996].   
･･･(1) 
Where    ＯＩi,  t       ：Adjusted Operat ing Income 
                 Ｓi, t-k  ：Sales 
                 ＴＡit-1  ：Tangible Assets (Capital Expenditure) 










                 ＲＤi, t-k  ：R&D Spending 
                 ＡＤi, t-1  ：Advert isement Expense 
  To verify Hypothesis 1, reverse regression of the mult iple regression 
equation (1) is needed, as fol lows;   
･･･(2) 
Where          ＯＩi,  t   ：Adjusted Operat ing Income 
                 Ｓi, t-k  ：Sales 
                 ＴＡi, t-1  ：Tangible Assets (Capital Expenditure) 
                 ＲＤi, t-k  ：R&D Spending 
                 ＡＤi, t-1  ：Advert isement Expense 
  To verify Hypothesis 2, mult iple regression equation (1) was used. 
 
Ⅵ   Analysis and Results 
1. Sample 
  Although the number of Japanese electronics companies l isted on the First 
Sect ion of the Tokyo Stock Exchange has varied from 140 to 150, the number 
of companies for which a complete data set was available for the period from 










1980 to 2005 was 533 in the AMSUS data base (Nikkei Quick Co.)4.  
 
2. Results 
H1. Managers do not adjust R&D spending to improve short-term performance. 
H2. Managers do not change the content of R&D spending to improve 
short-term performance. 
  For Hypothesis 1, we determined the relat ionship between the R&D 
investment of each previous year and the adjusted operat ing income of each 
year using mult iple regression equation (2), while controll ing for the effects of 
capital expenditure and advert isement act ivity. Concerning Hypothesis 1, the 




                                               
3
 The names of the companies and the i r  descrip t ive s ta t is t ics  are shown at the end of the 
paper .  Al l  53 companies have been l is ted on the f i rs t  sec t ion o f  Tokyo Stock Exchange. 53 is  
a suf f ic ient sample s ize for our  mul t ip le  regress ions. 
     
4
 AMSUS is  a  f inanc ia l  data  base which Nikke i  Quick  Co.  provides. 
ht tp : / /corporate .qu ick.co. jp /serv ice/product /amsus_market .h tml 
【 table 2.】 (See the result of the analysis 1 at the end of this paper) 
                         AIC represents Akaike Information Criter ia5. 
  Investment in R&D was shown to be strongly inf luenced by the operat ing 
income through all periods analyzed, at a signif icance level less than 1 %. The 
length of the t ime lag was one (current period) or two years (one year 
previously), except for 2005.   
  Next, we analyzed the relat ionship between the adjusted operat ing income of 
each year and the R&D investment of each previous year using mult iple 
regression equation (1), while controll ing for the effects of capital expenditure 
and advert isement act ivity,  Concerning Hypothesis 2, the result  of the 
Polynomial regression is as fol lows;  
 
                                               
5 Two cr i ter ia  are of ten used to  re f lec t  the c loseness of f i t  and the number o f  parameters  
es t imated.  One is  the Akaike in format ion cr i ter ion (AIC),  and the o ther  is  the Bayes ian 
in format ion cr i ter ion (BIC).  AIC is  a  more genera l  c r i ter ion that  can be appl ied to  any model  
that  can be es t imated by the method of  maximum l ike l ihood.  See Maddala [2005] ,  pp.  485, 
488, 525. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Time Lag 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Significance 
Level
0.002 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001
AIC 3.158 2.645 3.017 2.797 3.087 3.874 3.077 2.698 3.346 3.177 3.034 3.329 3.249 2.734 3.494
【 table 3.】 (See the result of the analysis 2 at the end of this paper) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Time Lag 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
Significance 
Level
0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 4.801 3.747 2.831 8.436 9.866 3.910 8.389 7.027 5.523 2.648 3.611 4.025 4.278 3.895 3.722
Duration of 
Effect (year)
5 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 4
 
The result  of investment in R&D was found to be ref lected in the operat ing 
income after a t ime lag through all periods, at a signif icance level of less than 
1 %. The length of the t ime lag was three or four years before 1999, but it  
decreased to one year after 2000 and continued as such unti l  2005. 
 
3. Implications 
  First ly,  Hypothesis 1 "Managers do not adjust R&D spending to improve 
short-term performance" was stat ist ically rejected. This shows that managers 
engaged in earnings management that included adjustments to R&D spending. 
  Secondly, Hypothesis 2 "Managers do not change the content of R&D 
spending to improve short-term performance" was also stat ist ically rejected. 
This indicates the possibil i ty that corporate managers changed the content of  
R&D spending after the cr isis in the Japanese electronics industry to create 
short-term performance improvements.  
  Thirdly, we found empir ical evidence that corporate managers have adopted 
two kinds of real R&D spending manipulat ion. Corporate managers have 
adjusted R&D spending and at the same t ime may have changed the content of 
R&D spending to improve short-term performance. 
 
4. Limitations 
  A problem may exist concerning the second hypothesis. We cannot conclude 
without a doubt that the decrease in the period of the t ime lag was due solely to 
the myopic decisions of management because there is the possibil i ty that the 
decrease was due to reduced product l ife cycles brought about by rapid 
technological innovation. However, there is collateral evidence indicat ing that  
Japanese electronics companies pulled the tr igger and made strategic changes 
in the content of R&D when the electronics industry fel l  into a cr it ical situat ion 
from 2000 to 2001. 
 
Ⅵ   Conclusion  
  Japanese companies have been prohibited from using accrual manipulat ion 
for R&D since 1999; however, many Japanese companies had not used accrual 
manipulat ion even before 1999 because of tax benefits, despite the fact that 
they could have used it  for R&D spending based on the exist ing accounting 
rules. This indicates that Japanese f irms generally used real manipulat ion by 
(A) increasing or decreasing R&D spending and/or by (B) changing the content 
of R&D to meet their short-term target results. This paper shows empir ical 
evidence that Japanese electronics companies have used real manipulat ion 
regardless of changes in the accounting rules. 
  First ly,  R&D investment was both an impetus for growth and a source of  
competit ive advantage, as shown by the stat ist ically meaningful relat ionship 
between R&D spending and adjusted operat ing income during the period of our 
analysis (see Table 3).  This result  coincides with the results of previous 
studies by Ett l ie [1998] and Lev and Sougiannis [1996].  
  Secondly, R&D investment was adjusted ( increased or decreased) by the 
current or past adjusted operat ing income, as shown by the stat ist ically 
meaningful relat ionship concerning the inf luence from operat ing income on 
R&D spending during the period of  our analysis (see Table 2).  Our results 
show that adjustment of R&D spending has been a means of real earnings 
management by Japanese Electronics companies. 
  Thirdly, there is empir ical evidence that corporate managers might have 
adopted another method of real manipulat ion, changing the content of R&D 
spending, to improve short-term performance:  The length of the t ime lag was 
three or four years before 1999, but it decreased to one year after 2000 and 
continued as such unti l  2005, although there may be other reasons for this 
phenomenon, such as technological innovation from analog to digital or 
productive innovation.  
 
C o m p a n y  N a m e s  
IBIDEN CO., LTD NEC Corporation 
KONICA MINOLTA HOLDINGS, INC. FUJITSU LIMITED 
Minebea Co., Ltd. IWATSU ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. 
TOSHIBA CORPORATION NEC Infrontia Corporation 
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Sanken Electric Co., Ltd. 
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(TOYO ELECTRIC MFG. CO. LTD. )  
ＥＰＳＯＮ ＴＯＹＯＣＯＭ ＣＯＲＰＯＲ
ＡＴＩＯＮ 
YASKAWA Electric Corporation Kyosan Electric Mfg. Co., Ltd. 
Shinko Electric Co., Ltd.  NOHMI BOSAI LTD. 
MEIDENSHA CORPORATION Japan Radio Co., Ltd. 
Origin ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. 
TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION SHARP CORPORATION 
TAKAOKA ELECTRIC MFG.CO.,LTD. Hitachi Kokusai Electric Inc. 
OSAKI ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. Sony Corporation 
OMRON Corporation NEC TOKIN Corporation 
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TAMURA Corporation IWASAKI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. 
IKEGAMI TSUSHINKI CO.,LTD. Ushio Inc. 
PIONEER CORPORATION Shin-Kobe Electric Machinery Co. ,Ltd. 
Victor Company of Japan, Limited (JVC) CASIO COMPUTER CO.,LTD. 
Foster Electric Company, Limited Nihon Inter Electronics Corporation 
Clarion Co., Ltd. Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation.  
TOKO,INC. ICHIKOH INDUSTRIES,LTD. 
Hoshiden Corporation KOITO MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 
HIROSE ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. DAINIPPON SCREEN MFG. CO., LTD. 
Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, Limited Canon Inc. 
Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. Ricoh Company, Ltd.  



















Almon, S., [1965] "The distributed lag between capital appropriation and expenditure" 
Econometrica  Vol.33, pp.178-196. 
Bushee, B.J. [1998],“The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment 
behavior.” The Account ing Review ,  Vol .73,  No.3  (Ju ly,1998) ,  pp.305-333.  
Dechow, P.  and R. G.  Sloan [1991],  “Execut ive incent ives  and horizon problem: an empi r ica l  
invest igat ion” ,  Journa l  o f  Account ing and Economics ,  Vol .14,  pp.51-89. 
Ett l ie  J .  E.  [1998] “R&D and g lobal  manufactur ing per formance.” ,Management  Sc ience ,  
Vol .44,No1.  pp.1-11. 
Feltham, G.A.,  and J.  Ohlson [1995] "Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and 
f inancial activit ies, Contemporary Accounting Research , Vol.11, pp.689-732. 
Gril iches, Z. [1980], "Returns to Research and Development Expenditures in the Private    
 Sector," in Kendrick, J. W. and B. N. Vaccara, eds., New Developments in Productivity 
Measurement and Analysis, The University of Chicago Press . 
Healy,  P. M.[2002],  “R&D Accounting and the Tradeoff between Relevance and Objectivity,”  
Journal of Accounting Research , Vol.40, No.3, pp.677-711. 
Lev, B and T. Saugianis [1996], "The Capital ization , Amortization, and Value-Relevance of R&D, 
" Journal of Accounting and Economics , No.21, pp.107-138.  
Lev, B[2004], "Sharpening the Intangibles Edge,"  Harvard Business Review, Vol.82, Issue 6, 
pp.109-116. 
Maddala,G.S., [1977] "Econometrics -International edit ion-" McGraw-Hil l . 
Mande, V., R. G. File, and W. Kwak [2000], “Income smoothing and discretionary R&D  
expenditures of Japanese firms.”,Contemporary Accounting Research , Vol.17,No.2, 
pp.263-302. 
Nishimura, Y. [2001], R&D Strategy and Accounting , Hakuto-shobo. 
OECD [2001], The New Economy: Beyond the Hype , OECD Publications. 
Pakes, A and M. Schankerman[1984], “The Rate of Obsolescence of Knowledge, Research 
Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources,” NBER Working Paper,  
No.346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.  
R o y c h o w d h u r y ,  S  [ 2 0 0 6 ]  “ E a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  t h r o u g h  r e a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
m a n i p u l a t i o n . ” ,  J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  E c o n o m i c s ,  V o l . 4 2 , p p . 3 3 5 - 3 7 0 .  
Sakakibara, K. and M. Tsujimoto [2003], “Why did the Efficiency of Japanese Companies’ R&D 
decrease ?,” Economic and Socia l  Research Inst i tute. 
Shipper ,  K. [1989]  “Commentary on earnings management . ” ,  Account ing Hor i zons ,  Vo l .3 ,  
pp.91-102. 
Suto,M. ,  L.Menkhof f ,  and D. Beckmann[2005] ,"Behaviora l  b iases of ins t i tu t ional  investors  
under  pressure f rom customers: 
Japan and Germany vs . the US." ,  W IF-05-006,Waseda Universi ty 
Suto,  M and M.  Toshino.  "Behavioral  B iases of  Japanese Ins t i tu t iona l  Investors:  fund 
management and corporate governance” ,  Corporate Governance: An In ternat iona l  Rev iew ,  
Vol .13,  No.4, 2005, pp.466-477. 
Yaekura, T. ,  “The Relat ionship between Cost A l locat ion of  R&D Investment and Future  
Per formance,”  K. I to  Ed. Account ing for  In tangib les ,  2006,  pp. 317-337,  Hakuto-shobo. 
 
 Ac k n ow l e d g m e n t s  
  W e  a r e  t h a n k f u l  f o r  t h e  c ommen t s  a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s  o f  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t  a  w o r k s h o p  a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  T a i w a n  U n i v e r s i t y  o n  t h e  
2 n d  o f  F e b r u a r y ,  2 0 0 8  i n  wh i c h  w e  m a d e  a  p r e s e n t a t i o n  c o v e r i n g  t h e  
s ame  t o p i c  a s  t h i s  p a p e r． Sp e c i a l  t h a n k s  g o  t o  P r o f e s s o r s  S .  L i ,  J .  
T s a y ,  C .  L i n ,  K .  C h e n ,  a n d  C .  W a ng .  
